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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
The Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

Did the Trial Court commit reversible error by ruling that

Appellants failed to establish a prima facie case of wrongful interference with
economic relations?
II. Did the trial court commit reversible error by ruling that Appellees
did not wrongfully initiate the proceedings in the lower court?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The same standard of review applies to both issues. It is set forth in
Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Utah 1991); and Grayson Roper Ltd.
vs. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467 (Utah 1989) as follows:
...[W]e review the trial court's legal conclusions under a
correction-of-error standard according those conclusions
no particular deference.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A-

NATURE OF THE CASE
A. Carter Davis and Shirleen Davis ("Davis") are Plaintiffs and

Counterclaim Defendants in the trial court action, and Appellees in this
appeal. Ideal Management Company, a trust, Jerry Huish, Trustee, and Jeny
Huish, individually ("Huish") (collectively referred to as "Ideal") are
Defendants and Counterclaim Plaintiffs, and Appellants in this appeal.
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In November 1992, Davis prepared and entered into an Earnest Money
Sales Agreement for Residential Construction (the "Purchase Agreement") to
purchase a new residence being constructed by Ideal at 1224 East 12 Pines
Circle, Sandy, Utah (the "Property") for $183,000.00, conditional upon the sale
of the Davis' house.
In April, 1993, Mr. Davis told Mr. Huish that the Davises had not sold
their house, and that the Davises could not and would not purchase the
Property. As a result, Ideal listed the Property for sale with Wardley Realty.
Thereafter, the Davises returned the key to the house to Mr. Huish.
A few weeks later, the Davises received an offer on their house and
Mrs. Davis called Mr. Huish to see if Ideal would still sell the Property to the
Davises for the same amount set forth in the Purchase Agreement. Mr. Huish
told Mrs. Davis that since the Davises had cancelled the Purchase Agreement
and Ideal had listed the property, the Davises would have to make a new offer
through Ideal's realtor.
Rather than make an offer, Davis had an attorney demand that Ideal
sell the Property to Davis or be sued.
Ideal responded, advised the Davises' attorney that Ideal had received
an offer of $209,00.00 from a third party and gave Davis an opportunity to
match the offer.
Davis did not match the offer. Instead, Davis filed suit to compel Ideal
to sell the Property to Davis for $183,000.00.
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Ideal answered the complaint denying that there was any contract or
obligation to sell the Property to Davis. The trial court agreed.
Thereafter, Ideal amended its counterclaim to assert wrongful
interference with economic relations and wrongful initiation of the lawsuit.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On May 12, 1993, Davis commenced an action against Ideal by filing

a complaint which sought to force Ideal to sell the Property to Davis for
$183,000.00 and prevent Ideal from selling the property to any third party. A
lis pendens was recorded. (R. 2).
On May 24, 1993, Ideal filed a counterclaim alleging breach of
contract, slander of title, and sought quiet title in the Property. (R. 20-46).
Motions for summary judgment were filed by both parties. (R. 53-54, R. 100101, R. 141-142). Both motions were denied on October 6, 1993. (R. 198).
An evidentiary hearing was held December 10, 1993, after which the
Court ruled that there was no meeting of the minds under the Purchase
Agreement, that no contract existed between the parties, and there was no
basis to order Ideal to sell the Property to Davis. (R. 243). Thereafter, on or
about January 27, 1994, counsel for Ideal filed a follow-up motion for
summary judgment. (R. 252).

Davis filed a counter-motion. (R. 282).

A

Minute Entry granted summary judgment to Ideal, quieting title in Ideal. (R.
311-313). A partial summary judgment was signed on May 9, 1994, in favor
of Ideal, declaring that the Lis Pendens "does not constitute a valid claim or
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interest in [the Property]" and quieting title in Ideal. (R. 314-316)
On April 7,1995, Ideal filed an amended counterclaim which included
additional causes of action for (1) wrongful interference with prospective
economic relations and (2) wrongful initiation of proceedings (R. 355-367),
which claims were tried before the Honorable Tyrone Medley, without a jury,
on May 3, 1995.
C DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL COURT
At the conclusion of Ideal's presentation of its case at trial, and cross
examination by Davises counsel, without hearing any evidence to dispute the
facts presented by Ideal, the Court directed verdict against Ideal, holding that
Ideal had failed to present facts sufficient to establish its claims for wrongful
interference with prospective economic relations and wrongful filing of
proceedings. The Court also required Ideal to pay back $3,000.00 to Davis.
(R. 406-413).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. In November, 1992, Davis and Ideal entered the Purchase Agreement
for the purchase of the Property, conditioned upon the sale of the Davises' house.
(R.438-437) No realtor was involved. (On January 18,1994, the trial court found
there was no meeting of the minds and the purported Purchase Agreement was
unenforceable.) (R. 243).
2. By early April, 1993, the Davises had not sold their house and when
asked by Huish if the Davises intended to complete the purchase, Mr. Davis
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specifically told Huish that the Davises were not going to purchase the Property.
Mr. Davis also told Huish to relist or do whatever Ideal had to do to find another
buyer. (R. 441, lines 7-18; also see R. 450, lines 14-25). Davis also gave the key
to the Property back to Huish. (R. 443, lines 17 through R. 444, line 1)
3. Ideal listed the Property for sale with a realtor. (R. 441, line 23, and R.
442, line 1).
4. Following the events described in paragraph 2, above, neither Mr. nor
Mrs. Davis ever objected to Ideal posting or listing the Property for sale. (R. 444
lines 2-5).
5. Near the end of April, 1993, Mrs. Davis called Huish and said that the
Davises had received an offer on the Davis house and the Davises wanted to
purchase the Property for the Purchase Agreement amount. (R. 442, lines 1-4).
6. Huish reminded Mrs. Davis that the Davises had withdrawn the offer
to purchase, that there was no contract between the parties, that Ideal had incurred
additional expenses, that Ideal had listed the Property, and that the Davises would
have to contact Ideal's realtor if the Davises wanted to make an offer. Mrs.
Davis said the Davises were going to sue Ideal if Ideal would not sell the Property
for $183,000.00 to the Davises. Huish again advised Mrs. Davis that there were
now realtor fees involved, that Ideal's agent was Dolly Howard and any offer
Davis made would be considered. (R. 442 lines 4-20; also see R. 452 lines 21R. 453 line 6).
7. Huish received a letter from the Davises counsel, Mr. Rogan, dated
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April 29, 1993, demanding that Ideal sell the Property to Davis for $183,000.00
or be sued. The letter also stated that the sale of the Davises' house would not
close until around May 23, 1993. (R. 445 line 23 to R. 446 line 4; Exhibit D-6).
8. On May 5, 1993, Huish received an offer from another buyer for a
greater price than in the Purchase Agreement. (R. 445, lines 9-22; Exhibit D-7).
9. On May 7, 1993, Ideal gave Davis notice of an offer from a third party
to purchase the Property for $209,000.00, and gave Davis an opportunity to match
the offer. Davis did not match the offer. (R. 446, line 20 - R. 447, line 7; Exhibit
D-8).
10. The Davises filed suit as threatened for the purpose of tying up the title
to the Property to further their purpose of forcing Ideal to sell the Property to
them under the terms of the Purchase Agreement. (R. 48 lines 11-18).
11. Davis told Huish the suit was filed to prevent Ideal from selling the
Property to anyone else. (R. 450 line 11 - R. 451 line 2).
12. Ideal's follow-up motion for summary judgment was granted to Ideal
in May 1994, quieting title in Ideal, (R. 314-316) after which Ideal was able to
sell the Property. (R. 449 lines 13-17).
13. At the trial of this matter, at the conclusion of evidence presented by
Ideal, and after cross examination, without hearing any evidence in
contravention of Ideal's case, the trial court ruled against Ideal on Ideal's claims
for intentional interference with economic relations and for wrongful initiation of
proceeding. (R. 406-413).
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14. Evidence of damages was received via exhibits, but no testimony of
damages was permitted because the trial court would not allow testiimony on the
issue of damages in light of its decision to rule against Ideal on the issue of
liability. (R. 434 lines 14 through R. 435 line 13; also see R. 449, lines 7-12).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Ideal has presented incontroverted evidence to support Ideal's claims that
Davis (1) wrongfully interfered with Ideal's economic relations and (2) wrongfully
initiated the lawsuit.
After Davis reneged on its offer to purchase the Property, Ideal listed the
Property for sale and found a buyer. Davis improperly held the Property hostage
by filing suit against Ideal, clouding title, with the intent to injure Ideal. Davis
thereby caused Ideal to suffer economic loss, for the purpose of forcing Ideal to
sell the Property to Davis.

Such "hostage taking" is tortious.

Davis has

intentionally interfered with Ideal's economic relations by wrongfully initiating the
lawsuit with the primary purpose of tying up title to the Property and filing a lis
pendens.
ARGUMENT
STATEMENT OF THE LAW APPLICABLE TO APPELLANTS' CLAIMS
A. INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC
RELATIONS
The Utah Supreme Court recognized the tort of intentional interference
with prospective economic relations in the case Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co.
vs. Isom. Utah, 657 P.2d 293 (1982). Therein, at page 304, the Utah Supreme
7

Court stated:
...in order to recover damages, the plaintiff must prove (1)
that the
defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiff's existing
or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose
or by improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff. Id.
at 304.
Leigh was the seller of a furniture business to Isom. Leigh sued Isom to
repossess the business, to terminate Isom's interest in the business, and to obtain
a deficiency judgment. Isom counterclaimed for intentional interference with
contractual relations.
Leigh pursued some previously initiated lawsuits against Isom, causing
Isom to incur the expense and effort of defending two groundless actions. Leigh
also deliberately breached its contract with Isom, and the court found that the
breach of the contract was for the purpose of injuring Isom. As a result, the
Supreme Court of Utah found that Leigh purposefully acted to ruin Isom's
business and obtain possession of the building.
1. INTENT
There is no question that the filing of the suit was intentional and for the
purpose of interfering with Ideal's right to sell the Property.
Huish testified that Mrs. Davis told Huish that the purpose of the suit was
to prevent Ideal from selling the property to anybody else. Thus, Mrs. Davis
manifested her intent to interfere with Ideal's economic relations. The testimony
before the court states:
Q. (Mr. Elggren): "Did you have any discussions

with the Davises to know what the purpose of the lawsuit
was?"
A. (Huish): "Well, Mrs. Davis said that she was
going to prevent me from selling it to anybody else; it was
her place. I said,' I beg your pardon, it is not your home.
You failed on that contract/ And she got very persistent."
Q. "So basically it is your understanding, if I'm
interpreting this correctly, that the Davises were taking the
action they took to prevent you from selling the property to
any third person?"
A. "Yes, it was."
Q. "And the means by which they were taking this
action was through the filing of the lawsuit; is that correct?"
A. "Yes, after they said they didn't want the house."
(R. 450 lines 11-25, R. 451 line 1-2) ( Also see Complaint
R. 2)
2. IMPROPER PURPOSE/IMPROPER MEANS
In Leigh, the court elucidated "improper purpose" by stating
"...improper purpose (or motive, intent, or objective) will support a cause
of action for intentional interference with prospective economic relations
even where the defendant's means were proper." It concluded its analysis
of the proof necessary to satisfy a showing of "improper purpose" by
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stating: "...improper piupose will be satisfied where it can be shown that
the actor's predominant purpose was to injure the plaintiff." Id. at 307.
On page 308, the court continued;
For example, in Alveska Pipeline Service Co..
Supra, the parties had a contract under which RCA
provided a communications systems along with Alyeska's
pipeline. RCA, in turn, contracted with Aurora to furnish
air transportation along the route. About a year later,
Aurora lost its contract with RCA when Alyeska elected to
take over the air transportation function under a contract
provision that permitted it to do so. Aurora thereupon
sought damages from Alyeska, alleging that Alyeska's
decision, which caused RCA to terminate its contract with
Aurora, had been motivated by spite, resulting from an
earlier payment dispute and litigation between Alyeska and
Aurora. Alyeska pleaded that it had acted to further its
own economic and safety interest. The Alaska Supreme
Court upheld the jury verdict against Alyeska, explaining:
[I]f one does not act in a good faith attempt
to protect his own interest or that of another but,
rather, is motivated by a desire to injure the
contract party, he forfeits the immunity afforded by
the privilege [Authorities cited]... In the case at bar,
the central factual issue... was whether Alyeska was
genuinely furthering its own economic and safety
interests or was using them as a facade for
inflicting injury upon Aurora. There was sufficient
evidence upon which the jury could properly find
that Alyeska was acting out of ill-will towards
Aurora, rather than to protect a legitimate business
interest, [emphasis added.]
The Utah Supreme Court also held that the requirement of showing
"improper means" was met by the plaintiff showing that it was forced to defend
a groundless lawsuit. The court stated:
By forcing Isom to defend what appear to have been
two groundless lawsuits, the Leigh Corporation was clearly
10

employing an improper means of interference with Isom's
business. Such use of civil litigation as a weapon to damage
another's business, besides being an intolerable waste of
judicial resources, may give rise to independent causes of
action in tort for abuse of process and malicious
prosecution. Id. at 309.
In the present case, Mr. Davis told Huish that the Davises would not
purchase the Property in April, 1993. (R 441 lines 4-18)

The lower court

affirmed that there was no contract between Davis and Ideal. Even after the lower
court so ruled, Davis demonstrated an obstructive and dilatory intent to cause
injury and expense to Ideal by refusing to release the lis pendens after the trial
court found for Ideal. As a result, Ideal had to incur the expense of pursuing and
obtaining summary judgment and an order of the trial court to have the cloud on
the title removed.
Before the trial court, Huish testified that Davis also told Huish that the
purpose of the suit was to prevent Ideal from selling the property to anybody else.
Thus, Mrs. Davis manifested her intent to interfere with Ideal's economic relations.
Q. (Mr. Elggren): "Did you have any discussions
with the Davises to know what the purpose of the lawsuit
was?"
A. (Huish): "Well, Mrs. Davis said that she was
going to prevent me from selling it to anybody else; it was
her place. I said,' I beg your pardon, it is not your home.
You failed on that contract/ And she got very persistent."
Q. "So basically it is your understanding, if I'm
11

interpreting this correctly, that the Davises were taking the
action they took to prevent you from selling the property to
any third person?"
A. "Yes, it was."
Q. "And the means by which they were taking this
action was through the filing of the lawsuit; is that correct?"
A. "Yes, after they said they didn't want the house."
(R. 450 lines 11-25, R. 451 line 1-2) ( Also see Complaint
R.2)
As Mr. Huish testified at the trial, after suit had been filed and the trial
court found no contract between Ideal and Davis, Ideal requested that the lis
pendens be removed so that the Property could be sold. Mr. Huish testified:
Q. (Elggren): Now with respect to the events that
followed, did the Davises ever release the property to you
to allow you to sell the same?
A. (Huish):

No, they did not.

After repeated

requests, and even after the court found there was no
contract between us because of a "no meeting of the
minds," and we requested specifically that they release the
lis pendens, they still maliciously held us hostage and
would not release the property to the owner. (R. 448, lines
19-25, R. 449, lines 1-2)
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The facts before the trial court showed that the primary purpose of the suit
filed by Davis was to injure Ideal. Davis sought to hold the Property hostage and
prevent the sale of the Property to any third party. Such action was clearly to
inflict injury upon Ideal, and thereby attempt to force Ideal to sell the Property to
the Davises at a time after which Davis had clearly cancelled and withdrawn the
Davises offer to purchase, (R. 441 lines 7-18; also R. 450 lines 14-25).
On cross examination by Davises' counsel, the fact that the Purchase
Agreement was not considered by Davis to be in effect was further affirmed.
Q. (Mr. Rogan): "And Mrs. Davis said to you that
she and her husband were going to sue you?''
A (Huish): "Yes, that was a threat."
Q.

"Did you respond as you testified by saying,

'Our contract with you is over'?"
A. "Yes, I did."
Q. "Was that statement that you made based upon
legal counsel, or was that your own opinion?"
A. "No, that is what Mr. Davis told me. He said he
wasn't going to buy the house. It was over and done and
I could sell it to someone else."
Q.

"So your conversation was based on your

understanding of what Mr. Davis told you, that they weren't
going to buy the house?"
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A. "Exactly/' (R. P. 453, lines 11-25)
In Top Service Body Shop. Inc. vs. Allstate Ins. Co., 582 P.2d 1365 (Or
1977) at page 1371, the Oregon Supreme Court discussed improper means as an
element of wrongful interference with economic relations.. In footnote 11, it
stated:
11. Commonly included among improper means are
violence, threats or other intimidation, deceit or
misrepresentation,

bribery,

unfounded

litigation,

defamation, or disparaging falsehood, (our emphasis.)
As set forth above, the Davises threatened and did file an unfounded action
with the trial court. Such action constitutes "improper means".
In a factually similar case, GS Enterprises v. Falmouth Marine. 571 N.E.
2d 1363 (Mass. 1991), that court found facts supporting a finding of intentional
interference with economic relations. In that action, the defendant ("FMI") filed
a law suit and lis pendens that temporarily interfered with the performance of a
contract. The plaintiff, ("GSEI") had a contract with FOREI. At pages 1369 and
1370, the court states:
It is undisputed that GSEI had a contract with
FOREI, and that FMI's lawsuit and lis pendens at least
temporarily interfered with the performance of that contract.
Therefore, like the motion judge and the parties, we focus
on whether there is a genuine dispute regarding the
propriety of FMI's suit, and whether there is a genuine
dispute regarding harm to GSEI because of the interference
with the contract.
To determine whether a particular act that interferes
with contractual relations of a plaintiff and a third party is
14

improper, it is necessary to consider whether the act had an
improper motive or constituted an improper means,
(citations omitted.)
In this case, however, the means in question
consisted of a lawsuit, an act which is subject to evaluation
against objective standards. It is clear, for example, that a
party is justified in interfering in a third-party's contract
with another by filing a lawsuit in a good faith effort to
assert legally protected rights. See Restatement (Second) of
Torts, supra at section 773. At the same time, however, a
civil action is wrongful if its initiator does not have
probable cause to believe that the suit will succeed, and is
acting primarily for a purpose other than that of properly
adjudicating his claims. See Restatement (Second) of Torts,
section 674(a) (1977).
In this case, there was evidence on the record that
FMI was motivated primarily to prevent land developers
from obtaining the property. An FMI principal testified that
FMI originally became interested in buying MacDougalls'
to "protect" it from development
In sum as we review the materials before the motion
judge, there are presented jury questions as to whether FMI
was motivated simply by a spiteful desire to block
development, and whether FMI sued FOREI in bad faith
and without probable cause to believe that the action
would succeed, rather than to assert legitimate rights. If
accepted by a fact-finder, GSEFs evidence would satisfy the
Geltman requirement of intentional interference that is
improper in motive or means, (compare Leigh Furniture &
Carpet Co. v. Isom. 657 P.2d. 293, 306-307 (Utah 1982)....
(our emphasis)
In the present case, the trial court failed to properly apply the law
established by the Utah Supreme Court in Leigh and should be reversed. The
Purchase Agreement had unequivocally been terminated by the Davises.

The

Davises could not thereafter reasonably believe that they had a good-faith purpose
in filing suit.
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3. CAUSING INJURY TO IDEAL
The trial court refused to receive testimony as to damages, because it ruled
Davis had not acted wrongfully in filing suit even though Davis had told Ideal the
offer was withdrawn,, The fact that damges were suffered by Ideal is undisputed
on the record and evidence of damages was received in the form of Exhibits D-14
through D-18.
B. WRONGFUL INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS
Abuse of process is actionable in Utah, Crease v. Pleasant Grove City. 519
P.2d 888 (Utah 1974). Crease arose because Pleasant Grove City had fined
Crease and jailed him for failure to pay a sewer charge. Crease sued the city.
The question on appeal was whether there was a reasonable basis to sustain a
cause of action for abuse of process. At page 890, the Court stated as follows:
(FN 3) It is to be conceded that even though an
action may have been properly initiated, and even though
the process (the commitment) was lawfully issued, if it was
used for an ulterior purpose for which it was not intended.
that could be found to be actionable as an abuse of process
(FN 4). This is so because the essence of that cause of
action is a perversion of the process to accomplish some
improper purpose, such as compelling its victim to do
something which he would not otherwise be legally
obligated to do. (our underlining)
In the instant case, Ideal was not obligated to sell the Property to Davis
because Davis had backed out of and cancelled the Purchase Agreement in April
of 1993. (R. 441 lines 14-15; R. 451 lines 21 through 452 line 9) As such, the
filing of the suit itself, in an attempt to compel Ideal "to do something which
[Ideal] would not otherwise be legally obligated to do", is an abuse of process.
16

The Utah Supreme Court, in the case Hansen vs. Kohler. 550 P2d 186
(Utah 1976), held that although the filing of a lis pendens is privileged, an action
may be maintained for damages arising out of the law suit and lis pendens. In
Hansen the court quoted extensively and with approval Restatement, Torts, Section
638, Comment c, stating, in relevant part:
One against whom civil or criminal proceedings are
initiated may recover in an action for the wrongful initiation
of the proceedings, under the rule stated in sections 674 to
680, if the proceedings have terminated in his favor and
were initiated without probable cause and for an improper
purpose. Id. at 190.
Restatement, Torts, Section 674, states:
One who initiates or procures the initiation of civil
proceedings against another is liable to him for the harm
done thereby if
(a) the proceedings are initiated
(i) without probable cause, and
(ii) primarily for a purpose other than that of
securing the adjudication of the claim on which
the proceedings are based, and
(b) except where they are ex parte, the proceedings
have terminated in favor of the person against whom they
are brought.
Restatement, Torts, Section 675, states:
One who initiates civil proceedings against another
has probable cause for so doing if he reasonably
believes in the existence of the facts upon which his
claim is based, and
(a) reasonably believes that under such facts
the claim may be valid at common law or
under an existing statute, or
(b) so believes in reliance upon the advise of
counsel given under the conditions stated in
Section 666.

17

Section 666 relates to the wrongful filing of criminal proceedings. That
is not applicable in this particular case.
In the present case, Ideal showed that the Davises' predominate purpose in
bringing the lawsuit was not to prove the facts alleged; rather, the predominate
purpose was to stop the sale of the Property to a "anybody else", (R. 450 lines
11-14) which would injure Ideal.
Restatement, Torts, Section 676, states:
To subject a person to liability under the rule stated
in Section 674, the proceedings must have been initiated
primarily for a purpose other than that of securing the
adjudication of the claim on which they are based.
By way of illustration of the meaning of Section 676, the comment thereto states:
Illustration:
1. A has purchased at sheriffs sale Blackacre subject
to a statutory right of redemption in B, the original owner
of Blackacre. B is negotiating a mortgage on Whiteacre in
order to put himself in funds in order to exercise his right
of redemption. A brings an action against B attacking B's
title to Whiteacre in order to prevent the redemption of
Blackacre. The purpose for which the action is brought is
improper.
Section 681 of Restatement of Torts deals with damages. It states as
follows:
When the essential elements of a cause of action
stated in §674 have been established, the plaintiff is entitled
to recover for
(a) the harm normally resulting from any arrest or
imprisonment, or any dispossession or interference
with the advantageous use of his land, chattels or
other things, suffered by him during the course of
the proceedings, and
(b) the harm to his reputation by any defamatory
18

matter alleged as the basis of the proceedings, and
(c) the expense which he has reasonably incurred
in defending himself against the proceedings, and
(d) any specific pecuniary loss which has resulted
from the proceedings, and
(e) any distress which is caused by the proceedings
The comment on Clause (a) states:
b. Where the initiation of civil proceedings
causes the arrest or imprisonment of the defendant or
dispossession of his land, chattels or other things, the
plaintiff is entitled to recover the same damages as
though his arrest, imprisonment or dispossession was
caused by any other tortious means. Therefore, it includes
the harm which normally results from any of these and
which, therefore, is assumed to have been suffered in the
particular case. In addition, the plaintiff is entitled to
recover under the rule stated in Clause (d), damages to
compensate him for any pecuniary loss or other material
harm which has been caused by his arrest or dispossession
of his things or the interference with his advantageous use
of them.
With respect to Clause (d), the comment states:
e. If, in addition to the elements of damage above
enumerated, the plaintiff can prove any other loss of a
pecuniary character which has resulted from the initiation
of the civil proceedings, he is entitled to recover therefor.
Such loss usually results from the harm done to the
plaintiffs reputation by the defamatory character of the
matter alleged as the basis of the proceedings or from his
imprisonment or the deprivation of his possession of his
land or chattels or other things. Thus, the harm for which
he can recover includes any business or other loss which
he sustains during his imprisonment and the loss of an
opportunity to sell a thing of which he is dispossessed....
So too, one against whom another has wrongfully obtained
an injunction which prevents him from making
advantageous use of his land, chattels or other things or
from carrying on his legitimate business activities, is
entitled to recover the loss which he has thereby sustained,
(our emphasis)
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Costs and attorney's fees are included within those damages, (see footnotes
to Clause (d).)
The filing of the suit by Davis was wrongful because the Davises filed the
lawsuit solely for the purpose of preventing Ideal from being able to sell
Ideal's property.
At trial, Huish testified that Mrs. Davis told Ideal that the purpose of the
suit was to prevent Ideal from selling the property to anybody else, even though
Mr. Davis had admitted to Mr. Huish that he knew the Purchase Agreement had
been terminated. (R. 453 lines 14-25). That testimony is incontroverted. Thus,
the Davises manifested their intent to injure Ideal by filing suit. (R. 450 lines 1125, R. 451 line 1-2) ( Also see Complaint R. 2)
The Davises' malicious intent to cause injury was further revealed by their
failure to release claims even after the court ruled against Davis in December
1993. Ideal requested that the lis pendens be removed so that the Property could
be sold. Davis refused. (R. 448, lines 19-25, R. 449, lines 1-2) Not until Ideal's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was granted, in May 9, 1994, 1993, (R.
314) was the cloud on the title removed, even though the trial court declared there
was no contract in January 1994.
In summary, the Davises' expressed motive, i.e., to injure Ideal if Ideal
would not agree to reinstate the Purchse Agreement, was manifested by the
Davises' own admissions which are ^incontroverted. As a result, Ideal is entitled
by law to be compensated for Ideal's losses and expenses resulting from the
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wrongful initiation of proceedings by the Davises.
CONCLUSION
The lower court has misapplied the law as set forth in Leigh Furniture v.
Isom 657 P.2d 293 (Utah, 1982), and has condoned the hostage taking by Davis
after receiving the uncontroverted evidence set forth above.
The case law stated above supports Ideal's position that the Davises' actions
were wrongful. Ideal clearly established by uncontroverted evidence that the
Davises' expressed motive was to injure Ideal by filing and maintaining suit.
Courts should not tolerate such "hostage taking." Ideal was deprived of the use of
the Property for over one year because of the Davises' suit. The Davises should
not be permitted to walk away from damages caused by them without
compensating Ideal for the losses Ideal suffered.
Dated this \ I

day of September, 1995.
ELGGREN & VAN DYKE

STEPHEN B. ELGGREN
Stephen B. Elggren
Attorney for Appellants
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed two (2) true and correct copies
of the above and foregoing APPELLANTS BRIEF, via U.S. Mail, first class
postage prepaid, this i1 ~"' day of September, 1995, directed to:
Thomas F. Rogan
136 South Main St. Suite 325
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

STEPHEN B. ELGGRr.«V
£\ch\7727brf.app

Stephen B . Elggren
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EXHIBIT 1: FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Third Judicial District

Thomas F. Rogan (4506)
Attorney for A. Carter Davis and
Shirleen C. Davis
13 6 South Main Street, Suite 325
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: 801-3 55-04 61
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CARTER DAVIS AND SHIRLEEN C.
DAVIS, HIS SPOUSE,
FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW

Plaintiffs
-vsIDEAL MANAGEMENT COMPANY, A TRUST,
JERRY HUISH, TRUSTEE; AND
JERRY HUISH INDIVIDUALLY
Defendants
IDEAL MANAGEMENT COMPANY, A TRUST,
JERRY HUISH, TRUSTEE; AND
JERRY HUISH INDIVIDUALLY,
Counterclaim Plaintiffs

Case 930902664PR
Judge Tyrone E. Medley

-vsA. CARTER DAVIS AND SHIRLEEN C.
DAVIS, HIS SPOUSE,
Counterclaim Defendants
Before coming to trial on May 5, 1995, the Court addressed substantive issues raised in this matter on two
occasions: the first, by Minute Entry on January 18, 1995,
after having determined that the Earnest Money Sales Agreement of Mr. Huish and Mr. and Mrs. Davis was ambiguous on
its face and after having received extrinsic evidence at
-1-

a hearing on December 10, 1994, to resolve the ambiguity of
the Agreement; and the second, ruling on Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment by granting partial declaratory relief
to quiet title based on the Court's January Minute Entry.
Now having considered further evidence at trial on
May 5, 1995, the Court enters Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follow.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court provided the parties an with ex-

pedited hearing on December 10, 1994, to consider extrinsic
evidence in an effort to resolve the ambiguous Earnest
Money Sales Agreement ("the Agreement") between Mr. Huish
and Mr. and Mrs. Davis.
2.

The evidence presented at the hearing

showed that the parties had substantially different understandings with regard to the price which would be paid
for the property which was the subject of the Agreement
and thus failed to resolve the ambiguity of the Agreement.
3.

The payment terms and price to be paid for

the property were material elements of the parties' Agreement.
4.

Given the lack of agreement on these mater-

ial elements, there was no meeting of the minds between
the parties to the Agreement.
5.

On May 12, 1993, Mr. and Mrs. Davis through

counsel filed suit and recorded with the Office of the Salt
-2-

Lake County Recorder a Lis Pendens giving notice of the
pendency of this action and the relief sought by them.
6.

On May 21, 1993, Mr, Huish through counsel

demanded under Utah Code Section 38-9-1 that the plaintiffs remove the Lis Pendens.
7.

The Plaintiffs recorded the Lis Pendens

in good faith and upon the advice of counsel to preserve
what they believed to be their right to pursue the remedy
of specific performance under the Agreement.
8.

The Plaintiffs intentionally filed this

law suit and recorded the Lis Pendens.
9.

The recording of the Lis Pendens inter-

fered with the prospective economic relations of the
Defendants•
10.

The Plaintiffs did not act for an improper

purpose or by an improper means when they filed the law
suit or recorded the Lis Pendens.
11.

The Plaintiffs were acting within their

rights by initiating this law suit.
12.

The Plaintiffs deposited $3,000 as earnest

money under their Agreement with Mr. Huish.
14.

By the terms of the Agreement, Mr. Huish

was to return the $3,000 deposit to the Plaintiffs if
they were unable to complete the transaction under the
terms of the Agreement deemed ambiguous by the Court.
15.

Mr. Huish has not returned the $3,000
-3-

earnest money deposit to the Plaintiffs.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
(a)

As previously determined by the Court:

the Agreement between Mr. Huish and Mr. and Mrs.
Davis is ambiguous on its face;

(b)

there was no contract between Mr. Huish and Mr.
and Mrs. Davis; and

(c)

title has been quieted in favor of Mr. Huish.
2.

Mr. and Mrs. Davis have not slandered

Defendants' title to the property.
3.

Mr. and Mrs. Davis are not liable for

interfering with the prospective economic advantage
of the Defendants.
4.

Mr. and Mrs. Davis are not liable to

the Defendants' by reason of their having filed this
law suit.
5.

The Defendants are not entitled to recover

damages from Mr. and Mrs. Davis.
6.

However, Mr. and Mrs Davis are entitled to

recover from the Defendants their $3,000 earnest money
which has not been returned to them.
DATED this * Q

day of May, 1995.

EXHIBIT 2: ORDER

Third Judicial District

MAY 2 5 1995
Thomas F. Rogan (4506)
Attorney for A. Carter Davis and
Shirleen C. Davis
13 6 South Main Street, Suite 325
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: 8 01-3 55-04 61
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

A. CARTER DAVIS AND SHIRLEEN C.
DAVIS, HIS SPOUSE,
Plaintiffs
ORDER

-vsIDEAL MANAGEMENT COMPANY, A TRUST,
JERRY HUISH, TRUSTEE; AND
JERRY HUISH INDIVIDUALLY
Defendants
IDEAL MANAGEMENT COMPANY, A TRUST,
JERRY HUISH, TRUSTEE; AND
JERRY HUISH INDIVIDUALLY,
Counterclaim Plaintiffs

Case 930902664PR
Judge Tyrone E. Medley

-vsA. CARTER DAVIS AND SHIRLEEN C.
DAVIS, HIS SPOUSE,
Counterclaim Defendants
On this

^)cj

day of May, 1995, this Court made

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this matter
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED that the defendants recover nothing from the plaintiffs under the Complaint and
Counterclaim and that judgment be entered in favor of the
-1-

plaintiffs against the defendants for $3,000, each partybearing its own costs and attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED, this GJ-&

day of May, 1995.
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EXHIBIT 3: JUDGMENT
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JUDGEMENT

MAY 2 5 1995
CttLT LA..E Cl-u." t /

Thomas F. Rogan (4506)
Attorney for A. Carter Davis and
Shirleen C. Davis
13 6 South Main Street, Suite 325
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: 8 01-3 55-04 61
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

A. CARTER DAVIS AND SHIRLEEN C.
DAVIS, HIS SPOUSE,
Plaintiffs
-vs-

JUDGMENT

IDEAL MANAGEMENT COMPANY, A TRUST,
JERRY HUISH, TRUSTEE; AND
JERRY HUISH INDIVIDUALLY
Defendants
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IDEAL MANAGEMENT COMPANY, A TRUST,
JERRY HUISH, TRUSTEE; AND
JERRY HUISH INDIVIDUALLY,
Counterclaim Plaintiffs

Case 930902664PR
Judge Tyrone E. Medley-

-vsA. CARTER DAVIS AND SHIRLEEN C.
DAVIS, HIS SPOUSE,
Counterclaim Defendants
As order by the Court on the ^)ff

day of May, 1995,

IT IS NOW ADJUDGED as follows in this matter:
1.

Judgment is entered in favor of the Plain-

tiffs and against the Defendants for $3,000.
2.

Each party is to bear its own costs and
-1-

attorney's fees,
DATED this

d a y o f May,

1995
BY ?$E

COURT

UKE
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
On this 15th day of May, 1995, I delivered by
first-class U. S. Mail, postage pre-paid, a copy of
these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Order,
and Judgment to Stephen B. Elggren, Elggren & Van Dyke,
2469 E. Fort Union Boulevard, Suite 202, Salt Lake City,
UT 84121-3343.

